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 Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in India 
 




This chapter analyzes the impact on incentives for India’s agriculture resulting of price, trade 
and exchange rate policies, focussing on incentives for agriculture relative to incentives for 
manufacturing and the rest of the economy. Previous studies have established that, during the 
1970s and 1980s and up to 1995,
1 the incentive system strongly favored manufacturing and 
the service sectors over the principal agricultural crops, although the extent of anti-
agricultural bias diminished considerably by the end of the period (Pursell 1999, p. 30). This 
study updates the earlier estimates to 2005 and incorporates estimates for agriculture going 
back to 1965. In addition it extends the previous work by taking account of policies affecting 
incentives for the production of fresh fruit and vegetables and  dairying, which between them 
account for large shares of the rural economy as measured by their contributions to GDP. In 
addition, policies affecting food processing are discussed briefly. 
The chapter is organized as follows. It begins with brief overviews of Indian 
economic growth and structural changes in the economy and the evolution of India’s trade 
policies since independence, including comments on the effects of India’s present agricultural 
trade policies on agricultural trade with its neighbours in South Asia.This is followed by a 
discussion  of the exchange rate and how exchange rate changes have interacted with trade 
policies, especially during the massive Rupee devaluation which started in 1985 and ended in 
1993. Quantitative evidence on nominal rates of assistance to various agricultural sub-sectors, 
including via electricity and fertilizer input  subsidies, are then provided, followed by 
estimates of distortions to incentives for farmers relative to producers of non-agricultural 
tradables. The latter shows that the marked anti-agricultural bias of policies of earlier years 
gradually disappeared, and in  
the current decade has been replaced by a slight bias in favor of agriculture. Finally, we 
discuss the political economy forces that are likely to influence the direction of future Indian 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, throughout the paper the years are Indian financial years e.g. 1996 is 1996/97 i.e. 
the financial year from April 1, 1996 to March 31, 1997. This includes the various time series, except for some 
(e.g. sugar and sugar cane) which use crop years.   
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policies, including the possibility that  a strong pro-agricultural bias may emerge along the 
lines followed by more-advanced densely populated economies in East Asia and elsewhere.  
 
 
Economic growth and structural changes  
 
 
Agriculture accounted for just over half of GDP in 1950, but now it is less than  one-fifth.
2 
Most of this decline was in crop agriculture. By contrast, the livestock sector (mainly 
dairying) grew faster than the rest of the economy, with its share rising from 2 percent in the 
early 1980s to 4.4 percent by 2005. Forestry was of some importance after independence, but 
in 2003 it provided only around 1 percent of GDP, as did fishing (despite fairly rapid growth 
over a long period, mainly impelled by fish farm development), while mining’s contribution 
has grown from less than 1 percent in the 1950s to 2.8 percent by 2005. The steep decline in 
agriculture’s contribution to the economy since independence has principally been due to 
much faster growth of the service sector, from just over 30 percent of GDP in 1950 to 63 
percent in 2003. The growth of the service sectors has been especially fast since the early 
1990s, and accelerated during the late 1990s and early 2000s with the rapid growth of 
information technology and outsourcing exports. The share of manufacturing in the economy 
also grew, but not nearly as rapidly as in many other developing countries. Its share of GDP 
in 2005 was 16 percent (much lower than in East Asian economies). This  compares with 
one-tenth in 1950, just after independence  (Table 1).  
Although the rural sector’s contribution to GDP has declined by almost two-thirds 
since independence, in 2003 it still accounted for around 60 percent of national employment, 
and this share has been declining only slowly since the early 1990s (partly because of slow 
growth in manufacturing employment).  
International trade in agricultural products has always been tiny in relation to the 
size of India’s agricultural sector. In 2005 imports of these products were only 0.8 percent of 
the value of agricultural production (or 2.1 percent if edible oil imports are included), while 
exports were 6.4 percent of production. Even in earlier periods when agriculture had major 
                                                 
2 Here and in some other places in this chapter the term “agriculture” is used broadly to include agricultural 
acivities in the Indian sense (including crop agriculture and horticulture) plus livestock activities, inland and 
ocean fisheries, and forestry activities. Whether this broad meaning of the term is intended should be apparent 
from the context. The computations below of agricultural rates of assistance include livestock but not fisheries 
or forestry, consistent with the rest of the country case studies in this World Bank research project.  
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shares in total Indian trade (e.g., 27 percent and 44 percent of total imports and exports, 
respectively, in 1960), that still only accounted for just above 3 percent of agricultural 
production (Table 2). 
The largest of the early primary agricultural imports was wheat, followed by cotton 
and powdered milk. From around the mid-1970s these and other agricultural imports were 
substituted by domestic production, and since then they have constituted very small shares of 
total imports, even in years when there were imports of products such as wheat and sugar due 
to poor seasons. 
The largest consistent imports of processed food have been edible oils. These 
expanded rapidly during the 1970s and early 1980s, triggering a major government program 
to substitute them with domestic production. For a while edible oil imports declined but, 
despite very high tariffs (e.g., 80 percent for palm oil in 2006), import growth resumed during 
the 1990s and the 2000s and currently accounts for about 40 percent of domestic 
consumption.  
During the 1950s and 1960s agricultural products used to account for just under half 
of India’s total merchandise exports, but the share has consistently declined and is now 
usually around 10 percent. A very diverse set of agricultural products are regularly exported, 
including fish and fish preparations, oil cakes, cashew kernels, tea, coffee, tobacco, spices, 
fruit and vegetables, pulses, basmati rice, and periodically large quantities of sugar and 
common rice (e.g. over 4 million tons of rice during 2004/05). Except for cashew kernels, the 
share of exports in the total production of most of these individual products is very small. 
Since the late 1980s manufactured exports have usually accounted for 70 percent to 
80 percent of India’s total merchandise exports, compared to between 40 percent and 50 
percent during the 1950s and 1960s. Manufactured exports have also increased in relation to 
total manufacturing production, especially since the late 1980s, growing about twice as fast at 
20-30 percent per year during the first half of the 2000s. However, by the standards of many 
other developing countries, they still constitute a small share of manufacturing sector output 
(one-seventh in 2005). 
Service exports have also been growing very rapidly in recent years, at about 25 
percent annually. In 2004 net invisible exports were 4.9 percent of GDP, compared with 
negative net balances pre-1990. The most dynamic components are software exports, other 
information technology related exports, and services outsourcing.    
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  Before turning to the trade-related policies that have influenced these production and 
trade developments, it is important  to understand the expenditure side of the Indian 
economy. The share of food expenditure in Indian household budgets is very high, amounting 
to 54 percent and 42 percent of total per capita consumption expenditure in rural and urban 
areas, respectively. The shares of food in the budgets of the poorest one-tenth of households 
is even higher, averaging 62 percent in rural areas and 58 percent in urban areas in 2003. 
With such high shares in family budgets – which have been declining only slowly over time – 
it is not surprising that food prices and food availability have been and remain one of the 
major consistent news items in both the local and national press and other media, and that 
food prices – especially sudden increases, as in 2008 – are highly sensitive politically. One of 
the most prominent objectives of the Indian independence movement was to put in place 
institutions and policies that would permanently eliminate the recurrence of the catastrophic 
famines that occurred during the colonial period, and which would also ensure that basic 
foods were available to the whole population at affordable prices.  
In order to achieve these  food policy objectives, the government has intervened in 
foodgrain markets from the late 1940s. In 1958 it established the present public distribution 
system (PDS) which sells basic foods at subsidized prices through many (currently about 
460,000) “fair price” shops. For most of its history the PDS distributed wheat, rice, sugar and 
edible oils on the basis of ration cards which entitled every Indian citizen to specified 
quantities at announced low prices. In June 1997 the system was fundamentally changed by 
distinguishing “below poverty line” (BPL) and “above poverty line” (APL) buyers, with the 
former eligible for especially low prices and the latter eligible to buy at prices which were 
only slightly below free market prices. Then in 2001 edible oils were taken out of the system, 
and in 2002 the role of sugar was drastically reduced by limiting subsidized sales to BPL 
families only. At present the principal government food subsidy activity is the sale of rice and 
wheat through the fair price shops to BPL families and as part of other anti-poverty programs. 
In 2003 the total central government food subsidy was estimated at Rs 258 billion (about $US 
5.7 billion and 0.83 percent of GDP) , defined as the excess of FCI’s total procurement 










From the second half of the nineteenth century until about 1921, India’s British rulers 
followed free trade policies with practically no restrictions or taxes on exports or imports. 
These free trade policies began to change in about 1921 following the collapse of the post-
World War I boom, and protective tariffs continued to be introduced during the 1920s and 
1930s. Then in 1940, general controls were imposed on all imports and exports in order to 
deal with the scarcities of goods, shipping and foreign exchange and wartime priorities. The 
general rule was that imports would only be allowed if they were essential and could not be 
supplied by local industries. 
After independence in August 1947, wartime import controls were relaxed by 
expanding the scope of Open General License (OGL) lists of goods that could be imported 
without obtaining a license, and increasing tariffs in order to take some of the pressure off the 
import licensing system. But the start of the Second Five Year Plan in 1956 coincided with a 
severe foreign exchange crisis, and the following period up to 1966 was characterized by 
comprehensive and tight administration of the import licensing system. These foreign trade 
policies were an extension of more general economic policies under which the “commanding 
heights” of the industrial economy (but not farming) were dominated by state enterprises, and 
the private sector (including agriculture) was subject to very extensive controls, which 
collectively came to be known as the “License Raj”.  
In June 1966 the Rupee was devalued, and this was accompanied by a brief 
liberalization episode during which import licensing was relaxed, tariffs were cut, and export 
subsidies were abolished or reduced. However, the import licensing system remained intact 
and by 1968 most of the liberalizing initiatives had been reversed and tight import and 
domestic controls reinstated. This remained the situation until the end of the 1970s, when a 
new phase of very slow partial liberalization commenced. 
The slow liberalization trend of the late 1970s and early 1980s included relaxations of 
industrial licensing rules, regular additions of intermediate products and capital goods to 
OGL lists, and tariff increases which succeeded in capturing some of the economic rents 
inherent in the import licensing system. It gained some momentum during the Rajiv Gandhi 
                                                 
3 In this and the following section the discussion of policies before 1990 relies to a large extent on Pursell 
(1992). More information on the earlier years – especially the 1960s and 1970s – can be found in references 
cited there.  
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government (1985-89), when economic growth moved above the very slow average rate that 
had characterized the previous 40 years. The boom culminated in a severe foreign exchange 
crisis in 1991, to which the government reacted with a sharp devaluation accompanied by 
sweeping liberalization measures which removed many of the key domestic controls over 
manufacturing, nearly all of the import licensing system for intermediate and capital goods, 
and a key export subsidy program. It also commenced a four-year program of tariff 
reductions. These tariff reductions continued into the 1990s and brought tariffs down to levels 
which were far below the extremely high or prohibitive rates (averaging over 100 percent) of 
the 1980s, but which were still very high by international standards.  
Both domestic and trade policies affecting the rural sector were basically untouched 
by the 1991 reforms. In particular state enterprises continued to dominate domestic and 
international trade in cereals (notably the Food Corporation of India, FCI, which periodically 
imported wheat to meet domestic shortages), and agricultural products remained subject to 
the import licensing system that applied to all consumer goods. With some important 
exceptions, import licenses were not issued for these products, and so the system amounted to 
an import ban. In agriculture, the exceptions were a few products for which imports had been 
open even during the most restrictive periods in the past (e.g., pulses), and others for which 
influential industrial lobbies had been able to negotiate unrestricted low-tariff imports of 
important inputs (e.g., cotton and wool). Edible oils were also imported on a large scale 
despite continuing efforts to replace them with domestic production, initially by state trading 
firms with import monopoly rights and later by the private sector, but subject to very high 
tariffs based on tariff values rather than actual cif prices.  
In the mid 1990s – five years after the 1991 reforms – it has been estimated that about 
two-thirds of tradable GDP was still protected by some kind of explicit non-tariff barrier: 
about 36 percent of manufacturing, 84 percent of agriculture, and 40 percent of mining. 
During the second half of the 1990s this began to change, in large measure as a response to 
international pressures linked to the Uruguay Round agreements and the negotiations 
associated with them. Starting in 1998, the general import licensing system was gradually 
dismantled, and on April 1, 2001 the last 715 of 2714 tariff lines (which included nearly all 
the agricultural tariff lines) were removed and the system itself was abolished.  
Understandably, after almost 50 years of de facto autarchy, the lifting of these 
controls generated considerable apprehension as to how well domestic producers of 
manufactured consumer goods and agricultural products would be able to compete with  
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imports. In response, a “War Room” was established in the Ministry of Commerce and a list 
of 300 “sensitive” products was established , imports of which were monitored to ensure that 
prompt action would be taken to pre-empt or minimize disruption to local production. More 
substantively, during and following the Uruguay Round negotiations, the government made 
sure it employed, or had on call, all the techniques for protecting or subsidizing domestic 
producers that are compatible with the WTO regime. This included techniques that are 
explicitly allowed as well as techniques of uncertain legality but which India believes can be 
employed in practice for limited or longer periods without attracting serious complaints from 
trading partners.
4  
Following the final abandonment of import licensing in April 2001, it soon became 
apparent that the “war room” psychology had greatly exaggerated the danger of rapidly 
expanding imports to domestic industries. During the next couple of years existing tariffs and 
the other measures that had been introduced proved more than adequate to keep out 
competing imports, both manufactured and agricultural. Eventually, without a formal 
announcement, the “sensitive list” quietly disappeared from official publications and public 
discussion. At the same time, manufactured exports entered a new phase of very rapid 
expansion which was still continuing in 2007 (at around 20-25 percent annually), and this 
was supplemented by similar fast growth of services exports. Together with increased capital 
inflow, these developments created a strong balance of payments and historically high 
foreign exchange reserves, and were accompanied by fast general economic growth.  
Responding to the new confidence that these changes created, in April 2003 a new 
program of drastic reductions in industrial tariffs commenced, which over the next four years 
reduced the average by approximately two-thirds, from over 33 percent to about 12 percent in 
                                                 
4 These included: modest general tariff increases through the use of para-tariffs on top of Customs duties from 
1997 until 2001; prohibitively high tariff bindings for most agricultural products under the Agreement on 
Agriculture (100, 150 or 300 percent), which allow applied agricultural tariffs on these products to be freely 
moved within a very wide range; specific tariffs on most textile fabrics and garments from 2001, which are 
much too high to allow any imports of these products into the Indian domestic market; new local content 
(TRIMS) rules for the auto industry, introduced in 1995 and dropped (following objections from other WTO 
members) in 2002; the widespread use of anti-dumping starting in the early 1990s, so far mainly applied to 
manufactured intermediates; the use of State Trading Enterprises (STEs) to control imports of cereals, fertilizers 
and petroleum products; the use of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) to protect local producers of edible oils and 
powdered milk; new rules on technical standards introduced in 2000, under the administration of the Bureau of 
Indian Standards; new SPS rules applicable to imports of nearly all livestock, agricultural and food products 
under the general supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture; ad hoc export subsidies which are periodically 
used to dispose of agricultural surpluses (e.g. wheat and sugar) and which are certainly inconsistent with the 
spirit, and possibly also with the letter of India’s no-export subsidy commitments under the AOA; and,starting 
in 2005, an export subsidy scheme for exports of fruits and vegetables, dairy products and poultry (WATS 
2006). Within India the predominant view appears to be that TBT and SPS measures, in addition to their 
legitimate WTO-sanctioned roles-are instruments which can to be activated or withdrawn according to whether 
individual industries, are in “need” of some form of non-tariff protection against imports.   
8
2007 (Figure 1).
5 This was followed by a further reduction in the 2007 budget. After these 
cuts, as measured by average ad valorem industrial tariffs, from being one of the world’s 
most protected countries India became one of the world’s low-protection countries.
6 Its 
average industrial tariffs are just slightly above China’s and Korea’s and at about the same 
level as in Sri Lanka (which traditionally has been considered the sole low-protection 
economy in South Asia). Moreover, because of the “tops down” reduction process, the 
industrial tariff structure is very uniform: in 2007 over 80 percent of industrial tariff lines 
were at the new general maximum of 10 percent or below, leaving limited scope for high 
effective protection through escalated tariff structures. 
However, from the beginning, agriculture and processed foods were left out of the 
new tariff reduction program (Figure 1). In 2006 unweighted average tariffs protecting these 
sectors (HS 01-24) were about 40 percent, almost four times the level of average industrial 
tariffs and among the highest in the world. Moreover, those tariffs are highly dispersed, with 
about 15 percent in the 50-100 percent range. As discussed later, these high tariffs have been 
maintained despite very substantial tariff redundancy for most agricultural commodities, with 
domestic prices not only lower than duty inclusive import prices but frequently lower than cif 
prices. This separate and special treatment of agricultural trade policies reflects strong 
pressures from many farmer and processor interest groups, mediated through and supported 
by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
Regional trading agreements 
 
A by-product of India’s highly protective agricultural trade policies is that trade in primary 
and processed agricultural and livestock products between India and its South Asian 
neighbours has been badly hindered.
7 Ironically, the biggest hindrance has very likely been to 
Indian exports to these countries rather than to Indian imports from the region. This is 
because Indian domestic prices are low, so that even under free trade the neighbouring 
                                                 
5 Calculated from information on tariffs and other import taxes published annually in Goyal (2007). This 
publication also gives detailed information on quantitative import restrictions, SPS and TBT rules, bilateral and 
regional trade agreements, and other trade policy instruments. Further reductions of industrial tariffs were made 
in the 2008 budget. 
6 The main exceptions to the new low industrial tariffs are specific duties on most textile fabrics and garments, 
and a 60 percent tariff protecting the auto industry. However, there is evidence of considerable tariff redundancy 
in these industries, with typical domestic ex-factory prices about equal to or even below import prices. There are 
also non-tariff barriers protecting domestic urea producers and domestic prices of products from some of these 
plants are high relative to world prices. 
7 Two exceptions are Bangladesh’s rice imports from India and India’s imports of raw jute from Bangladesh, 
both of which are subject to low tariffs.  
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countries would find it difficult to compete, while at the same time India’s high tariffs and 
other barriers to imports have reinforced and helped justify domestically the reluctance of the 
other South Asian countries to reduce their own barriers to agricultural trade, both 
multilaterally and as part of regional and bilateral preferential trade arrangements.  
Thus for many years the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) had 
very limited relevance for regional agricultural trade, because all agricultural imports into 
India were subject to India’s discretionary import licensing system. Import licensing was 
lifted for SAPTA members in 1998, three years before it was finally phased out for the rest of 
the world, but since then the combination of low domestic prices of most agricultural 
products, high redundant tariffs, and the continuing role of state trading enterprises has made 
it impossible for these countries to compete in the majority of India’s domestic markets. 
Except for Nepal and Bhutan, India has provided very few tariff preferences for agricultural 
products under its bilateral trade agreements, notably in its bilateral FTA with Sri Lanka. 
Under SAFTA, most agricultural tariff lines, including for processed foods, are on its 
“sensitive list” of products for which it has made no commitments.  
The reluctance to provide tariff preferences is in part to prevent imports from third 
countries via preference-receiving countries. In return Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 
have been unwilling to provide tariff preferences on agricultural products under SAPTA, and 
have also put most agricultural products that they produce on their SAFTA “sensitive” lists. 
This is largely a reaction to the Indian position, because even though these agreements in 
principle involve a number of countries, in practice the potential regional trade that really 
matters is bilateral trade with India. However, in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka it also reflects a 
realistic assessment that agricultural free trade with India would generate more agricultural 
imports from India than exports to India, in the process threatening the viability of some of 
these countries’ more highly protected agricultural industries such as sugar, various fresh 
fruits and vegetables and a wide range of processed foods in Bangladesh, and in Sri Lanka, 
rice, potatoes and onions.
8  
If it were opened up, India-Pakistan bilateral agricultural trade would probably be 
more balanced. Recent studies suggest that there is considerable potential for welfare 
                                                 
8 A study by the World Bank (2006) of the likely consequences of an FTA between India and Bangladesh 
reports that prices of many agricultural products and processed foods are higher in Bangladesh than in India. It 
concludes that under a bilateral FTA there appear to be few possibilities for expanded agricultural and processed 
food exports from Bangladesh to India, but considerable potential for increased Indian agricultural exports to 
Bangladesh. The latter would involve trade diversion costs for Bangladesh including lost customs revenue, 
resulting from the replacement of duty paying imports from the rest of the world by duty free imports from 
India.  
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improving bilateral trade in wheat and sugar. The direction and timing of this trade would 
vary with weather and other seasonal factors and, compared to trade through the ports with 
countries outside the South Asia region, would benefit from large transport cost savings, 
especially trade between the Indian northwest states and the Pakistan Punjab. It is also likely 
that Pakistani poultry and other livestock products could be profitably exported to India. But 
bilateral trade between India and Pakistan is hostage to their difficult political relationship, 
which is reflected in Pakistan’s “positive list” of products that can be legally imported from 
India. This list includes almost no agricultural products, in addition to which rules enforced in 
both countries (with a few minor exceptions) do not allow trade over the land border. 
 
The exchange rate regime and trade policies
9 
 
Trade policies have to be understood in the context of exchange rate policies. The Rupee was 
pegged to the pound sterling before and following independence in 1947 until September 
1975. In June 1966 the fixed Rupee/pound rate was devalued by 57.5 percent and therefore 
by the same proportion to the US dollar, to Rs 7.50. Following its fixed link with the pound, 
the Rupee/dollar rate floated down slightly between 1966 and 1975. In September 1975 the 
peg to the pound sterling was removed and until 1992 the rate was fixed by the Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI). In 1992 this was replaced by a managed float under which the RBI allows the 
Rupee to move in relation to a currency basket. During the 1980s, starting in 1982, this was 
followed by a prolonged period of nominal devaluation. The devaluation rate was rapid at 
first, slowed down for three years in the mid-1980s, and then accelerated between 1989 and 
1991. This process culminated in a major devaluation to deal with the July 1991 foreign 
exchange crisis, and the nominal Rupee/dollar rate fell by approximately 70 percent between 
1991 and 1993. During the next ten years the exchange rate was devalued at a modest rate 
which approximately offset Indian domestic inflation in relation to inflation in India’s 
principal trading partners. Since 2003 up to mid-2008, reflecting the new export boom and 
the build-up of large foreign exchange reserves, the nominal Rupee/dollar rate has been 
appreciating.  
To understand the economic significance of trends in India’s nominal exchange rates 
it is necessary to take account of the nominal rates with the currencies of all India’s principal 
trading partners (not just the US dollar) and of the inflation rate in India relative to inflation 
                                                 
9 A comprehensive account of Indian macroeconomic policies (including exchange rate policies) between 1964 
and 1991 is in Joshi and Little (1994).  
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rates in these countries. These effects are systematically captured in real effective exchange 
rate (REER ) series. Comprehensive REER indices are available for India since 1980. Figure 
2 illustrates an index for this period weighted by total trade with 25 countries, and this index 
has been linked to earlier estimates from World Bank and other reports to give a series 
starting in 1965. Based on this series, the interaction between India’s exchange rate history 
and its trade policies can be categorized into four periods. Details of the exchange rate 
changes and the related changes in sectoral trade policies in those periods are provided 
below, following a discussion of the period from independence to the mid-1960s. 
 
From 1947 to the 1966 devaluation 
 
By 1956 inflation had begun to erode the effects of a devaluation in 1949, and this continued 
and accelerated during the next 10 years, in effect amounting to a substantial real 
appreciation of the Rupee in relation to the fixed rates with the pound and the US dollar. For 
most of this period, agricultural trade policies were characterized by stringent export 
controls, and when exports were allowed, by high export taxes: for example on jute and jute 
products, oilcakes, cotton, tea and black pepper. Despite these restrictions and taxes, 
agricultural and mineral products (the latter also subject to export taxes) accounted for about 
half of foreign exchange earnings from exports, and as foreign exchange became increasingly 
scarce after 1956, the export taxes were steadily reduced and almost eliminated prior to the 
1966 devaluation. On the import side, agricultural imports by the private sector were 
effectively banned and substantial cereal imports, mostly of wheat under the US PL 480 
program, were managed by the government.  
In manufacturing, before and after independence nearly all imports were either 
subject to discretionary import licensing or were “canalised” by monopoly government 
trading organizations. After 1956 import licensing was regularly tightened in response to the 
steadily worsening foreign exchange situation, and tariffs were increased and reached very 
high levels by early 1966. As a result, large and highly variable gaps opened up between the 
domestic and international prices of manufactured products. The other principal reaction to 
the increasingly overvalued exchange rate was to attempt to offset the resulting anti-export 
bias by providing very substantial subsidies to manufactured exports, principally by allowing 
exporters to import duty free otherwise restricted raw materials, components and machines 
that they could sell in the domestic market for premiums that reflected scarcity values.   
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There are no studies that have attempted to measure the effects of these policies on 
relative incentives between agriculture and manufacturing during these years. From the 
literature on the economic policies of the period however, it is clear that the policy thrust 
favored manufacturing. It therefore seems highly likely that the period was characterized by 
marked anti-agricultural bias, which probably increased along with the increasing 
overvaluation of the exchange rate and the counter measures which concentrated on 
providing higher incentives to manufacturers, both in the domestic market and to their 
exports, while attempting to keep agricultural prices low and stable. 
 
From the 1966 devaluation to 1978 
 
The nominal devaluation in June 1966 was 57.5 percent in relation to the pound and the US 
dollar but, owing to high domestic inflation, it has been estimated that it was about 30 percent 
in real terms. However in the following years inflation was gradually brought down to much 
lower levels, and by 1980 the real effective exchange rate (REER) had declined by another 46 
percent (Figure 2). The 1966 devaluation was used to clean up some of the crisis-induced 
trade policies, but otherwise they remained highly restrictive and interventionist.  
In agriculture, one of the outcomes of the devaluation, and more importantly of the 
suspension of PL 480 grain supplies from the US during the first India-Pakistan war, was to 
reinforce the determination to become self-sufficient in food grains and other basic 
agricultural products. This coincided with the development and availability of new seeds and 
techniques the application of which practically eliminated previously substantial cereal 
imports by the end of 1970s, and was behind the program which started in 1971 to make 
India self sufficient in dairy products. To support these objectives, earlier policies were 
continued under which, with very few exceptions, the only imports of agricultural products 
allowed were bulk commodities such as wheat, which were imported according to need by 
parastatals. In the interests of domestic availability and low consumer prices, exports of most 
food products were not allowed, even though the domestic prices of some (notably rice) were 
usually well below farm level export parity prices. Immediately after the devaluation, export 
taxes on “non-essential” exported commodities (jute, coffee, tea, cotton, oil cakes, spices) 
were sharply increased, the apparent purpose being to absorb some of the windfall gains to 
exporters. However, because of slow export growth during the 1970s these taxes were 
steadily reduced and had once again practically disappeared by the early 1980s.  
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In manufacturing, the 1966 devaluation was accompanied by some relaxation of 
import licensing, tariff reductions and the abolition of some export subsidies and reductions 
in others. However, by 1968 tight import licensing had been reinstated under which the 
import of nearly all consumer goods (including textiles) was effectively banned and the only 
imports allowed were intermediate materials, components and capital equipment provided 
“actual users” could demonstrate that they were “essential” and not “indigenously available”. 
As previously, tariffs – which remained about the same during the 1970s – were mostly used 
to transfer some of the import licensing rents to the government, and were irrelevant as 
protective instruments except to the extent that they influenced the cost of imported 
intermediates and equipment that was not locally produced.  
As discussed in the following section, empirical evidence suggests that the trade 
policies during this period led to terms of trade for agriculture versus manufacturing in the 
Indian domestic economy that were highly unfavorable relative to the terms of trade 
prevailing in world markets. 
 
From 1978 to 1993 
 
A balance of payments crisis was averted in 1980 and 1981 with the help of an IMF loan 
while maintaining the real value of the Rupee, but from about April 1985 a new policy 
commenced under which the currency was steadily devalued in real terms. This continued 
without a break for the next six years, almost on a monthly basis, until a large sharp 
devaluation in July 1991, followed by about another year of further depreciation until 
September 1992. The real Rupee devaluation was very large during the second half of the 
1980s, about 62 percent between 1985 and 1990, and over the whole period to 1993 it was 
around 145 percent. Among other things, it radically changed the environment for India’s 
agricultural and manufacturing trade policies. 
In agriculture, the Rupee depreciation after 1985 partly offset a major decline in 
world agricultural prices which started in 1981 and continued into 1987. After 1987 world 
prices recovered and the continuing Rupee depreciation translated these changes into much 
larger increases in the border prices of some of India’s major agricultural commodities. 
However, owing to the traditional isolation of the domestic market, domestic prices of most 
of these commodities were unaffected and continued to move independently of changes in 
border prices. The principal exceptions were cotton, pulses, oilseed cakes, and the main  
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export oriented agricultural commodities, especially tea, coffee, spices, and tobacco which 
are sold in auction markets in which exporters and domestic traders compete. Despite many 
complex trade policy and other interventions, owing to the influence of the textile producers 
acting with the support of the Ministry of Textiles, domestic cotton prices broadly tracked 
border prices, and pulses were and remain the sole major primary food product which can be 
imported over low or moderate tariffs without import licensing and/or other interventions. 
India consistently has excess supplies of oilseed cakes (which are produced in fixed 
proportions by the edible oil industry when crushing oilseeds) owing to low demand from the 
livestock industry, which in turn is associated with the vegetarian diet of a large proportion of 
the Indian population. However, between them all these products only account for a very 
small share of total Indian agricultural production: around 14 percent of agricultural 
production, and about 10 percent of total rural production if livestock, fish, and forestry 
products are included. During this period all the rest (about 90 percent of total rural 
production) was essentially non-traded owing to government import monopolies, import 
licensing, export controls, and other non-tariff interventions as well as prohibitive tariffs in 
some cases.  
In manufacturing, during the 1980s domestic prices were similarly delinked from 
international prices by the import licensing system backed up by very high tariffs averaging 
over 100 percent. In addition manufactured exports, although growing faster than domestic 
production, were very small in relation to total manufacturing output (about 7 percent in the 
mid-1980s). Hence overall the massive Rupee devaluation did not directly pass through to 
domestic industrial prices. It principally affected them indirectly in a minor way through 
increases in export prices and in the prices of intermediates and capital goods that were 
allowed to be imported, which in turn increased manufacturing costs. The devaluation 
showed up in very big increases in border prices, which led to a steep decline in average 
implicit manufacturing protection, as measured by the excess of domestic ex-factory prices 
over border prices. This had a number of very important repercussions on manufacturing 
trade policies. First, it made the liberalization program that started in 1991 quite painless, 
including especially the abolition of nearly all import licensing of manufactured 
intermediates and of machinery and equipment, the removal of a major export subsidy, and 
the tariff reduction program that continued into the mid-1990s. Secondly, many Indian 
manufacturing firms that had felt vulnerable to import competition, now found that, following 
the correction of the earlier exchange rate overvaluation, they could not only easily compete  
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with imports but could outcompete foreign manufacturers in export markets. Combined with 
new sweeping domestic deregulation of manufacturing that accompanied the trade policy 
program, this created a new momentum in the manufacturing sector in terms of investment, 
productivity improvements, and output expansion. 
The repercussions of the devaluation on agriculture and manufacturing removed most 
of the systematic anti-agricultural bias of the incentive system as measured by relative 
assistance rates. However it did not translate into a noticeable improvement in the domestic 
terms of trade for agriculture, because nearly all agricultural prices and a large proportion of 
manufacturing prices (including all consumer goods) remained delinked from world prices by 
the import licensing system and other non-tariff barriers, and were still mainly determined by 
domestic conditions and policies. This situation did not begin to change until after the import 
licensing system was finally removed in 2001. 
 
From 1993 to 2007  
 
After 1993 and still continuing in mid-2007, the exchange rate has been managed by regular 
adjustments of the nominal rates which have stabilised the REER index at its post-
devaluation level within a narrow range of about 10 percent (Figure 2). The size of the 
devaluation up to 1993 probably overshot the decline needed to re-establish foreign exchange 
balance and to support the 1991 trade policy reforms. But by being maintained at this level 
for the next 14 years (by far the longest period of real exchange rate stability in India’s 
independent economic history) it also proved adequate to support the final removal of the 
import licensing system between 1998 and 2001, and the post-2003 tariff reduction program 
in manufacturing.  
In agriculture, however, highly protectionist trade policies continued throughout the 
1990s and were still in place in mid-2007, with, on the import side, high-to-prohibitive tariffs 
(plus technical standards and SPS controls in the background) playing the role previously 
carried out by import licensing and STE import monopolies.
10 With some exceptions, the 
predominant view is that international agricultural markets are unreliable and unstable and 
should only have a residual role in agricultural policies, in particular by providing extra 
                                                 
10 One previously major role of STEs in import and domestic policies was eliminated in June 2006 when it was 
announced that cereal imports would no longer be a monopoly of the Food Corporation of India (FCI), and that 
FCI will no longer buy wheat and rice at pre-announced procurement prices but will instead purchase supplies 
needed for India’s public distribution system and for general “food security” stocks in competitive wholesale 
markets. However, in 2006 wheat and rice tariffs were prohibitive at 50 and 70 or 80 percent respectively.  
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supplies in times of domestic shortages, and as a means of disposing of excess stocks in times 
of domestic surpluses. Consistent with this viewpoint, for some major commodities, 
particularly cereals and sugar, agricultural trade policies are highly opportunistic, involving 
frequent large changes, especially of tariffs
11 and export subsidies.
12 For other products, 
tariffs appear to be deliberately prohibitive. For example, 100 percent tariffs apply to tea and 
coffee, both of which are exported on a large scale with domestic prices set in auction 
markets in which both exporters and domestic traders operate, suggesting that domestic 
prices are about equivalent to international prices after allowing for quality differences. 
In manufacturing, after the 1991 reforms producers of intermediate materials and 
capital goods were no longer protected by import licensing, and manufacturing tariffs 
declined. But the devalued exchange rate plus manufacturing tariffs (mostly in the 30-40 
percent range) and other measures (notably anti-dumping) removed most competitive 
pressures on the import side. In addition, manufactured consumer goods, including the entire 
textile and garment sector, were still protected by import licensing until this system was 
steadily removed after 1998. Hence, during the 1990s and up to about 2004 most of 
manufacturing remained insulated from import competition, and the impact of world market 
conditions was mainly via manufactured exports, which however began to expand at a faster 
rate than overall manufacturing growth. This situation of partial orientation to world markets 
only changed in about 2004, following the final removal of import licensing in 2001 and the 
implementation of the first stages of the post-2003 manufacturing tariff reduction program. 
Since then most of the manufacturing sector, either through actual or potential imports over 
relatively low tariffs, or through exports, has been open to world markets. 
The 1985-1993 devaluations removed most of the longstanding anti-agricultural bias 
in the Indian incentive system, as measured by relative assistance rates. However, continuing 
high formal protection rates and very substantial tariff redundancy in both manufacturing and 
agriculture still allowed plenty of scope for the domestic terms of trade between the two to 
change substantially in either direction. But all this changed in the mid-2000s, since when 
tariffs have been providing real constraints on the domestic prices of manufactured goods. 
                                                 
11 Following long established practices, when agricultural tariffs are reduced, it will often be through a special 
exemption (partial or complete) for a particular occasion and/or importing organization, with the formal MFN 
tariff left unchanged. 
12 For example, between 2001 and 2005 very substantial export subsidies were paid to make it worthwhile for 
private traders to help dispose of large excess wheat stocks. In February 2006 it was announced that in view of 
inadequate stocks, FCI would import half a million tons of wheat at zero duty. Sugar trade policies have been 
and remain especially opportunistic, with large changes in tariffs during the 1990s to the present, and the use of 
export subsidies between 2001 and 2004 when about 4.3 million tons were exported (Pursell 2005).  
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However, continuing very high formal protection of agriculture, combined with high input 
subsidies, allow considerable scope for the past anti-agricultural bias of the system to move 
in the other direction. 
 
 
Measurement of distortions to agricultural incentives 
 
 
The main focus of the present study’s measurment of the extent of distortions to agricultural 
prices is on government-imposed policy measures that create a gap between actual domestic 
prices and what they would be under free markets.
13 Since it is not possible to understand the 
characteristics of agricultural development with a sectoral view alone, we not only provide 
estimates of the effects of direct agricultural policy measures (including distortions in the 
foreign exchange market), but also report estimates of distortions to prices faced by producers 
of non-agricultural products, most notably manufactures. Specifically, this study computes a 
Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for farmers including an adjustment for direct 
interventions on inputs such as subsidies for fertilizer and electricity. It also generates an 
aggregate NRA for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural 
tradables via the calculation of a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA – see Anderson et al. 
2008).  
There are 12 products examined in this study, plus the collective of fruits and 
vegetables. Milk is classified as an import-competing product. The other 11 commodities — 
rice, wheat, maize, sorghum, groundnut, rapeseed, soybean, sunflower, sugar, cotton, 
chickpea — have mixed-trade status, which means they are exportables or nontradables in 
some years and import-competing products in other years.
14 Over the period analysed, these 
primary agricultural commodities together account for nearly 70 percent of the value of 
                                                 
13 For the reasons discussed in Appendix 1, tariffs have been and remain irrelevant as indicators of actual 
differences between domestic and prevailing world prices for nearly all of India’s primary and processed 
agricultural products. Estimates of actual assistance rates therefore have to rely on painstaking direct product-
by-product comparisons of domestic with border prices adjusted by port, handling & domestic transport costs, 
supplemented by information on input protection rates and subsidies.  
14 The trade-status of each product in a given year is endogenously determined in the analysis, depending on 
whether the domestic price was greater than the import reference price (import-competing), less than the export 
reference price (exportable), or between those two (nontradable). The import reference price (also often called 
the import parity price) is the cif price plus port, handling, transport and other charges. The export reference 
price (also known as the export parity price) is the fob price minus transport, handling and other charges 
incurred in getting the product to the fob stage. As shown at the bottom of Appendix Table A4, the trade status 
is the same for at least two-thirds of the years for only four of the 13 product groups.  
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agricultural production in India, with the 11 crops making up approximately half of that 
share, fruit and vegetables one-quarter, and dairying another one-quarter in recent years 
(Table 3). 
The present study builds on a considerable body of earlier work, and uses the project’s 
methodology to provide a consistent and internationally comparable set of estimates back to 
1964 (or 1975 in the case of milk). Those earlier works include PSE estimates for India’s 
major crops, which are made available by IFPRI for the period 1984-2001;
15 estimates for 
fruits and vegetables in a recent World Bank study of India’s horticultural sector (Mattoo, 
Mishra and Narain 2005); and NRA estimates for raw milk based on a study of the dairy 
sector (Rakotoarisoa and Gulati 2006).  
It is important when considering our NRA estimates to bear in mind that for most 
products in most of the years covered, either there were no exports or imports, or exports and 
imports were much too small or specialized to provide reliable indications of the likely border 
prices of India’s domestic products. Consequently, domestic prices are compared with 
various international reference prices and then adjusted for (among other factors) delivery 
and selling terms, specification and quality differences, freight and insurance to or from the 
Indian border, Indian port costs, and domestic transport costs and margins. For major 
products domestic plus international transport and handling costs have been  high enough to 
make them nontradable on average 40 percent of the time. NRAs for fresh fruits and 
vegetables are especially sensitive to transport and handling costs, owing to the need for 
special packaging and transport and storage facilities (e.g. refrigeration) to minimize spoilage 
and maximize shelf life at the eventual final wholesale and retail markets. But even for food 
grains, where supplies in the inland growing regions also go to the large port cities, it is 
necessary to take into account domestic transport and trading margins from these regions to 
the port cities before comparing the producer farmgate price with the estimated cost of 
equivalent imported products landed at the port. These and numerous other complexities in 
estimating NRAs in India are discussed in Pursell, Gulati and Gupta (2009), while some of 
the sources and uses of the data for the various products are summarized in Appendix 2. 
  Earlier studies that have estimated NRAs or similar incentive indicators, like this one, 
use the official exchange rate to express border (fob or cif) prices in Rupees. During the years  
before the 1991 devalution when the black market premium was substantial (see Appendix 
Table A5), just about all agricultural trade (exports and imports) was in the hands of 
                                                 
15 See Gulati and Kelley (1999), Mullen, Orden and Gulati (2005), and Orden et al. (2007) and the references 
given there.  
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parastatal monopolies and  under the direct control of the central bank. In manufacturing  
there are reports of  underinvoicing of exports to accumulate unrecorded foreign exchange 
abroad, but the extent of underinvoicing was limited by the benefits to exporters of the 
various export facilitation schemes and export subsidies which were based on  declared fob 
values. The main suppliers and demanders in the parallel market for foreign exchange were 
Indian workers abroad remitting to India, and people in India buying foreign exchange to get 
black money out of the country. Since  the 1991 devaluation, when the principal export 
subsidy was removed and Reserve Bank of India foreign exchange controls relaxed, the 
parallel market premium has been negligible or nonexistent. 
 
Assistance to agriculture 
 
Our estimates of NRAs for India, which have been calculated from 1964 for crops and from 
1975 for dairying (raw milk), include output price distortions as well as estimates (only 
available since 1983) of the output price equivalent of input subsidies. Their sum is expressed 
as a percentage of the undistorted price (for example, the import reference price of a 
comparable product). The input subsidies have been allocated to the various crops in the 
manner summarized in Table 4.
16 
There are several striking features of the NRA estimates. First, their average across 
covered products shows only a slight upward trend over the 40 years surveyed (Figure 3 and 
Table 5).  
Second, that figure and table also show that the average NRA for import-competing 
products has been well above that for exportables, although the difference has narrowed since 
the reforms began in the early 1990s. Specifically, the NRA for import-competing products 
                                                 
16 On the complexities of calculating input subsidies in the Indian context, see Gulati and Narayanan (2003). 
There are implicit taxes on other tradable farm inputs due to import licensing and tariffs but in the second half of 
the 1980s they were quite small relative to the fertilizer and electricity subsidies (Gulati, Hanson and Pursell 
1990, Gulati and Kelley 1999, Pursell and Gupta 1998). Those implicit taxes came down further with 
manufacturing  protection as a whole during the period of the Rupee devaluations between 1985 and 1993. By 
2007 most tariffs on nearly all manufactured farm inputs and also on trucks and specialized handling, storage 
and agro-processing equipment had declined to 7.5 percent. Hence their exclusion biases upwards the above 
estimated contribution of input subsidies to crop NRAs by probably less than one percentage point. 
Indian farmers also benefit from subsidized credit and are exempt from income taxes, but these 
subsidies are very  small compared to the fertilizer and electricity subsidies. More importantly, farmers receive 
subsidized water from canal irrigation schemes in which water charges are far below operation and maintenance 
expenses, in addition to which they do not contribute to the capital costs of the dams, canals and other 
government investments of which they are the principal beneficiaries. The resource allocation consequences of 
the canal irrigation subsidies are especially problematic, basically because canal irrigation water supplies are 
rationed, so that increasing water charges would just transfer economic rents from farmers to the recipients of 
the water charges (mainly state governments) without directly affecting the production of the crops being 
irrigated. For this reason the canal irrigation subsidies have not been covered in this study.   
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averaged 62 percent in the 25 years to the end of the 1980s but only 32 percent in the 
subsequent 15 years, while the corresponding exportable NRA averages were -25 and -11 
percent, respectively. This is captured in the trade bias index, whose value averaged -0.53 in 
the period prior to 1990 and -0.32 thereafter (Table 6). 
Third, the NRAs fluctuate widely around their trend values. Even when NRAs are 
averaged over all import-competing or all exportable products, it is clear from Figure 3 that 
there is a lot of movement in NRAs from year to year. Partly this is a result of the trade status 
classification of products itself is changing often (see Appendix Table A4), but there is also a 
clear systematic element to this finding. Prior to the reforms of the 1990s, the average NRA 
for both import-competing and exportable products are lowest in 1974 when international 
food prices were at record highs, and highest around 1987 when international food prices 
were at record lows in real terms; and more generally there is little year-to-year correlation 
between the domestic and border prices of major food products. This reflects the success of 
the Indian government’s policies of stabilizing domestic prices and insulating domestic 
markets from fluctuations in world prices.  
That insulating role of policy measures is especially clear in terms of India’s main 
food staple, rice, whose domestic price in real terms has been kept very stable over the past 
41 years (Figure 4).
17 For most of the past four decades, export restrictions have generated an 
implicit export tax on rice that has varied substantially as international prices have moved. 
For example, in the 1990s its annual average varied from zero to 31 percent (Appendix Table 
A1) so as to keep the real consumer price from fluctuating. The figure also shows that this 
insulating policy generated a positive NRA for rice in the first five years of the present 
decade. Had the data been available for more years, they would have revealed that, with the 
hike in the international price of rice in 2007-08, India has again imposed restrictions on rice 
exports and thereby implicitly again taxed net sellers of rice for the benefit of net buyers of 
rice in India.  
Sugar is another example. As in many other countries, it is still subject to many 
sporadic interventions, especially trade policies. In 2007 the latter included de facto non-tariff 
import controls, a 60 percent import tariff, availability of export subsidies, and a complex 
policy that allows sugar mills with excess capacity to import unrefined sugar duty free for 
refining and resale in the domestic market. These policy measures are used not only to 
insulate the domestic market from the wide swings in sugar prices internationally but also to 
                                                 
17 To remove the effects of inflation, the Rupee prices have been expressed in constant 1981 Rupees using the 
Indian wholesale price index.   
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help deal with domestic disequilbria resulting from weather conditions and from production 
cycles generated by highly politicized minimum cane prices mandated by state governments. 
For example, during 2000-02, export subsidies were used to help dispose of large excess 
sugar stocks, whereas in some years during the 1990s imports were allowed duty free to meet 
temporary domestic shortages.
18 As for rice, domestic sugar prices have been kept quite 
stable for long periods, and have steadily declined over time in real terms: between 1965 and 
1982 they came down by about one-third and between 1981 and 2004 by a further one-
quarter. 
Fourth, the dispersion of NRAs across the dozen-plus covered products has been very 
wide, although it has narrowed considerably since the reforms began in the early 1990s. Prior 
to that, the average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean NRA was 45, 
whereas in the past 15 years that average has been just 10 (see bottom of Table 5). 
Fifth, there has been a steadily increasing contribution to the NRA for covered 
products from farm input subsidies, particularly for fertilizer and electricity mainly used in 
pumping irrigation water. In the latter 1980s those subsidies contributed 4 percentage points 
to the average NRA of 25 percent (data have not been compiled for earlier years), but by 
2000-05 they contributed almost 10 percentage points (see near bottom of Table 5).
19 
Without those input subsidies the average NRA would have been negative in the 1990s, 
mainly because of the restrictions on exports of rice (whose weight has been between one-
eighth and one-quarter over the past four decades – see Appendix Table A3). As can be seen 
in Figure 4, input subsidies helped to reduce the gap between the rice producer’s reward and 
the export price of rice in that decade.  
Finally on the covered products, while the trade status of each crop tends to change a 
lot over the past four decades, the extent of self sufficiency of each of the covered products 
nonetheless remains very close to 100 percent (Table 7). That is, in so far as India’s food 
                                                 
18  Over long periods sugar prices in India have been much lower than sugar prices in Bangladesh, where prices 
have been supported at very high levels, initially by QRs and later by Customs duties and various para-tariffs. 
These price differences have generated a regular legal export trade from India to Bangladesh, and also 
substantial unrecorded smuggled exports across the highly porous land border (Pursell 2007). However the 
quantities exported, though constituting large shares of the Bangladesh market, have not been sufficient to have 
much impact on domestic prices in India. If Bangladesh were to remove or substantially reduce its sugar tariffs, 
a principal initial impact would probably be to divert a considerable proportion of the smuggled imports from 
India into legal channels. Sugar prices in Pakistan are at about the same general level as Indian prices and there 
is considerable potential for welfare improving trade in both directions (especially across the land border) that 
would moderate seasonal and cyclical disturbances. But (except for occasional ad hoc relaxations), the highly 
restrictive bilateral trade relationship between the two countries prevents this from happening. 
19 The total input subsidy and subsidy rate appeared to have reached a plateau during the first five years of the 
2000s, but from 2007 there were very large increases in the fertilizer subsidy as the government partially 
insulated farmers from steep increases in world fertilizer prices.  
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price and trade policies have been aimed at reducing the country’s food import dependence, 
they have achieved that objective. 
 
Assistance to producers of agricultural relative to other tradable products 
 
In the absence of further information, we assume that the average NRA for covered products 
is the same as for India’s non-covered farm products (which account in 2000-04 for 30 
percent of total agricultural production). The incentives facing farmers depend not only on 
the agricultural NRA, however, but also on how trade and other price-distorting policies 
affect incentives facing producers in other tradable sectors. In order to see how relative 
incentives have evolved, Figure 5 and Table 6 compare the NRA for agricultural tradables 
with estimates of NRAs for non-agricultural tradables. Also shown there are estimates of the 
relative rate of assistance, defined in the footnote to Table 6. The NRA for non-farm 
activities is a weighted average of estimated NRAs for the tradable parts of manufacturing 
and mining. It thus assumes the services sector is non-tradable, which is a reasonable 
approximation until recently, and even today the tradable part of services is small relative to 
the size of the goods sectors.  
Until about 2004 average tariffs were not helpful indicators of protection levels in the 
Indian manufacturing sector. Consequently, we  have used the results of a recent study of 
manufacturing  implicit protection which covers the period 1970-2004 (Pursell, Kishore, and 
Gupta 2007). This study provides a time series which compares annual weighted averages of 
ex-factory prices of manufactured goods with the import prices of the same or similar 
goods.
20 This measure plausibly describes the economic history of the period. First, the 
extremely high implicit nominal protection of between 80 and 100 percent during the 1970s 
until the mid-1980s is consistent with what is known about the restrictive import licensing 
system of that period. Second, the steep decline in implicit nominal protection, from around 
70 percent in 1987 to almost zero in 1992, is consistent with the real Rupee devaluation of 
approximately 80 percent during the same period (see Figure 2). The devaluing Rupee during 
these years pushed up the border prices of importable manufactured goods expressed in 
                                                 
20 Only import reference prices have been used in measuring manufacturing assistance rates and aggregating 
them across manufacturing subsectors. Export reference prices were not considered directly, in part because 
manufactured exports have constituted a very small share of total Indian manufacturing production, but 
principally because fob-cif and export-import reference price gaps are generally quite small relative to 
manufactured good prices – certainly considerably smaller than the margins of error in the estimation methods 
used here.  
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Rupees, and these increases were far greater than the corresponding increases in the prices of 
domestically produced manufactured goods that went along with domestic inflation and other 
factors. Consequently, the average excess of the prices of domestically manufactured goods 
over the Rupee border prices of the same goods consistently declined, and by 1992 it seems 
to have almost disappeared altogether. After 1992 it increased for a while (between 1995 and 
1997 this possibly reflected low world prices associated with the Asian financial crisis), but 
in most years it was well below 20 percent and the average rate between 1992 and 2004 (the 
latest year for which estimates are available) was just 12 percent. Until 2002 apparent 
implicit protection rates were far below unweighted average industrial tariffs: for example 45 
percent in 1990 versus average tariffs of 129 percent, 9 percent in 1999 versus average tariffs 
of 39 percent, and 5 percent in 2002 versus average tariffs of 33 percent. This gap narrowed 
sharply in 2003, however, and the scope for domestic prices to exceed international prices 
continued to be reduced with the cuts in manufacturing tariffs in the March 2007 budget, 
which brought the average tariff down to below 10 percent. 
The most important group of non-farm tradable products other than manufactures are 
minerals, including coal, iron ore, crude oil and natural gas. These industries account for 
about 2.5 percent of GDP. At present tariffs on these items are low (in 2007 mostly zero, 2 
percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent, respectively) And except for crude oil and petroleum 
products there are no major quantitative restrictions on imports or exports. Trade in these 
products is considerable, with substantial imports (e.g. coal) and exports (e.g. iron ore). 
Starting from an assessment of the situation in 2004, an NRA series was constructed for this 
study. For coal, which accounted for about 62 percent of domestic mineral sector output in 
1970 and about 38 percent in 2004, these estimates assume that domestic prices were about 
equal to import reference prices in 2004 (NRA=0) and estimates of NRAs for earlier years 
were generated using the Indian coal wholesale price index and an index of Australian coal 
export prices.
21 This gave very low coal NRAs in many earlier years, which is consistent with 
the suppression of domestic coal prices and coal production (and potentially of coal exports) 
by the parastatal monopoly (Coal India) which controls the industry. This changed during the 
late 1990s when accelerating demand for coal pushed up domestic prices to about the level of 
import prices, eventually leading to the current situation where coal is being imported in large 
quantities, mostly over zero tariffs. The two other principal components of the mining sector 
                                                 
21 The resulting NRA series was cross checked by applying the same price indices to estimates of coal 
protection rates in 1982 made in an early study. The resulting series was broadly similar although with 
somewhat lower NRAs.    
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are petroleum and natural gas, and a catch-all category which includes all other minerals. In 
the absence of recent protection studies of these subsectors, based on limited information and 
judgments, it was assumed that their NRAs were zero over the whole period. This 
assumption, together with the estimates for coal, gave a weighted average NRA series for all 
mining. It comprises low NRAs up to about the mid-1980s, followed by NRAs in the vicinity 
of zero, indicating that on average domestic mineral prices were about equal to world prices 
from 1985 up to 2004.  
In the upper line of Figure 5 and in Table 6 the NRAs to mining are not shown 
separately, but are combined with those for manufacturing to provide a series of weighted 
average NRAs for manufacturing and mining together, using value added at distorted prices 
as weights.
22 For both manufacturing and mining, the estimates only go back to 1970: the  
NRAs for 1965-69 (113% in each year) are guesses that they would have been somewhat 
higher than average over 1970-74. NRAs of about this level seem plausible in the light of the 
known economic history of this period.
23 For the rest of the period covered for which there 
are estimates, the mineral sector share in combined value added ranged from 7 to 14 percent 
and averaged one-eighth. The implicit taxation of the mining sector during the 1970s and 
early 1980s pulls down the combined weighted average NRA below that for manufacturing 
alone. But the combined rate – although declining – remains very high during those years. 
From about 1993, however, following the steep decline in implicit manufacturing protection 
that accompanied the 1985-1993 Rupee devaluations, the two series merge at much lower 
levels, indicating historically low assistance levels to these sectors during the first half of the 
present decade.  
It is clear from Figure 5 and Table 6 that assistance to producers of non-agricultural 
tradables far exceeded that to farmers from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. This is reflected 
in the calculations of the relative rate of assistance (RRA), which is an indicator of the 
distortion to farm relative to non-farm prices for tradables. That RRA suggests than in the 
1960s and 1970s farmers effectively received less than half (RRA average of -51 percent) the 
                                                 
22 Value added (GDP share) weights have been used because they provide a better indication of the relative sizes 
of the two sectors than output weights. Ideally, to take account of I-O relations, especially in manufacturing, the  
effective protection of the two sectors should be averaged, using value added in world prices as weights. But 
there is only one known estimate of aggregate manufacturing effective protection (for 1986/87) and no time 
series, and neither estimates nor time series for the mineral sectors. Our judgment is that using this procedure – 
if it were possible -- would probably not change the general level or trend of the non-agricultural NRA series 
very much. On the one hand the average would be reduced -- especially during the 1970s and 1980s -- owing to 
the increased weight of the mineral sectors, but on the other hand it would probably be increased owing to likely 
excess of  effective protection rates over nominal protection rates in the manufacturing sector. 
23 See the earlier discussion of manufacturing trade policies prior to and following the 1966 devaluation.  
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relative price for their products as they would have under free markets. With the drop in 
international prices of food in the mid-1980s, the extent of the implicit export tax on rice and 
other exportable farm goods fell markedly, bringing up the NRA for farm and non-farm 
tradables to the same level so that the RRA was above zero in 1985-87. With a return to trend 
international food prices in the 1990s, agriculture’s NRA fell to close to zero so that, even 
though that for non-farm industries more than halved, the RRA returned to being negative 
(averaging -13 percent during that decade). Even though manufacturing protection fell 
dramatically during the 1985-93 devaluations, the devaluations also pushed up agricultural 
reference prices and reduced agricultural NRAs. Hence, following the devaluations and 
associated reforms the anti-agricultural bias in the system was still present, although it was 
far less marked than it had been. Then from the turn of the century, further manufacturing 
protection cuts combined with a rise in agricultural input subsidies brought agriculture’s 




Where are Indian policies heading? 
 
 
Protection levels in most of Indian manufacturing and also in the mining sector are now 
constrained by low tariffs, and even in a few industries which are protected by high tariffs – 
such as textile fabrics, garments and auto assembly – growing exports and domestic 
competition suggest that it is highly unlikely that prices are likely to rise much above world 
prices in the foreseeable future. By contrast most tariffs and other formal instruments 
protecting the agricultural sector are much higher than implicit protection rates, and if 
maintained at their present levels would not constrain domestic prices from rising well above 
world prices.  
How likely is it that India will follow a high protection/high subsidy path for its 
agriculture as its economy develops? The political economy of this question is complex, with 
some forces and arguments making it likely that a high protection path for agriculture will be 
followed, and others constraining this kind of development.  
Politically very important considerations that favor protection over open trade policies 
are first, the very high share of employment in the rural sector (still around 60 percent), the 
desire to insulate farmers from the large price fluctuations that occur in world agricultural  
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markets, and the feeling that India should be self sufficient, or nearly self sufficient, in the 
production of basic foods and other agricultural commodities (the argument being that Indian 
demand is too large to rely on world markets for supplies in the event of serious crop failures 
or other disruptions to supplies). These general arguments for protection reinforce the 
economic interests of farmer groups which are highly organized and politically effective at 
the level of the states and the central government. In the central government, as in other 
countries, the Ministry of Agriculture represents farmer interests and makes sure that these 
views are heard in policy discussions. These are the basic reasons for the exclusion of 
agriculture and the food processing industries from the liberalizing trade policy reforms in 
1991, for the fixing of very high tariff bindings during the Uruguay Round multilateral 
negotiations, and for leaving agriculture out of the unilateral tariff reduction program that 
started in 2003. They also explain the present high “just in case” agricultural tariffs, which 
are deliberately set at prohibitive levels to keep out imports, in case there is a dip in world 
prices or a niche market opportunity for imports opens up.  
On the other side, because of the very high share of food in Indian family budgets, 
there are strong pressures to keep agricultural prices down. For many years this objective 
dominated agricultural policies and was compatible with expanding production and national 
self-sufficiency, largely because of the successful adoption of “green revolution” 
technologies in crop agriculture that went along with large scale government investment in 
irrigation and other rural infrastructure. Between 1965 and 1988, domestic rice and wheat 
prices declined by 44 percent and 52 percent in real terms. Because of steadily increasing 
farm productivity, this major long-term benefit to consumers was compatible with increasing 
farmer prosperity, especially in north west India. There were further benefits to low-income 
households from subsidized rice and wheat supplied through the PDS system. In addition, the 
trade policy regime of the period kept the prices of the principal food grains low, directly 
through export restrictions, and indirectly by the exchange rate overvaluation which resulted 
from the high- protection import substitution policies in place for manufacturing. In the case 
of rice, during 1965-1988 an export ban was in place, and on average domestic rice prices 
were about 23 percent below export parity prices, and were lower still in relation to export 
prices under counter-factual simulations of the exchange rate under free trade.
24 In these 
ways, during the “License Raj” period food consumers benefited at the expense of farmers, 
although they lost as consumers of manufactured goods and, much more importantly, as a 
                                                 
24 This does not mean that domestic rice prices would have been on average 23 percent higher without the 
export ban, as Indian supply would have depressed world prices.   
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consequence of the missed opportunities for faster overall economic growth that was 
foregone because of these policies. 
There are no organized groups representing the interests of food consumers, like those 
that represent farmers and food processors. Nevertheless, politicians and bureaucrats are 
aware of, and sensitive to the consumer interest in food prices, which are still major topics in 
public debates, especially debates on the efficacy of supplying below poverty line (BPL) 
groups with subsidized wheat, rice and sugar through the PDS. In these ways consumer 
interests remain important counter forces to producer lobbies pressing for higher agricultural 
prices, usually in the form of increases in support prices. However, there are a number of 
factors which limit the extent to which this generalized concern for consumer welfare 
constrains the farmer and other producer lobbies.  
First, politicians and bureaucrats are mainly sensitive to increases in the retail prices 
of mass consumption “staple” foods such as wheat, rice, sugar, edible oils, milk, pulses, and 
some vegetables such as onions. They are less concerned with the prices of other food 
products, especially fresh fruits, vegetables and spices where consumers have long been 
accustomed to fluctuating prices in retail and wholesale markets.  
Second, as in other countries, producer lobbies can be at least partially placated by 
increases in input subsidies without incurring the political pain that may follow output price 
increases. This explains the rapid increase in the fertilizer and electricity subsidies since 
1985, the long term decline of charges for canal irrigation water to very low levels, and 
subsidized credit for farmers supplied through government banks. It also explains the 
government’s reactions to the 2007-08 boom in world agricultural and fertilizer prices, which 
on the one hand banned rice exports to protect domestic consumers, but on the other hand 
raised subsidies to keep domestic fertilizer prices far below world prices to placate farmers. 
But there are limits to increases in these subsidies: for example, no further subsidy is possible 
once electricity is supplied free of charge, as is the case in a number of Indian states. Also, 
the subsidies have financial and other consequences, notably the effects of the farm electricity 
subsidies on state government budgets and the viability and operating efficiency of State 
Electricity Boards, and the effects of the fertilizer subsidies on the central government budget 
(Gulati and Narayanan 2003). Up to about 2005,  there were  signs that these limits and 
consequences may have checked the rate of growth of farm subsidies. 
Third, on a number of occasions the objective of national food self-sufficiency has 
trumped concerns for consumer welfare. The clearest example is the unsuccessful attempt to  
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substitute domestic production for imported palm oil, initially with the use of import 
restrictions and currently with very high (85 percent) tariffs. Over long periods, dairy import 
policies have also involved very high prices for consumers, without generating much debate 
on their behalf. In both these cases, the interests pushing for the import substitution policies 
have dominated the public discussions, and there seems to have been little if any public 
awareness that much lower prices were realistic alternatives. 
Fourth, the political concern with the prices of staple foods is mainly with their 
stability, rather than with their level. There is concern on behalf of producers if prices 
unexpectedly decline, and concern on behalf of consumers if they unexpectedly increase. 
Although organized commodity markets and trade associations are increasingly aware of and 
are reporting international commodity prices, there has been little public knowledge of or 
interest in the extent to which domestic prices diverge from world prices. Consequently, 
behind the present high redundant tariffs, as long as there are no sudden large price changes, 
it is quite plausible that domestic food prices could steadily rise over time and increasingly 
diverge from international prices, especially if general inflation is low and the exchange rate 
appreciates. 
Finally, producer interests have found that they can be effective in blocking imports 
without attracting much opposition if they act quickly and early before the imports achieve 
much penetration of the domestic market. In that way there is minimal established importer 
and consumer interest to overcome. And by keeping out imports there is no or little 
subsequent consumer and political awareness of imports as a lower cost alternative to 
domestic production. Increases in tariffs on chicken parts (from 35 percent to 108 percent in 
2001) and garlic (from 35 percent to 108 percent in 2003) are recent examples of this 
strategy, and the same strategy could be applied to other products in the future if  imports 
threaten to penetrate the already comprehensive protective barriers.  
All this suggests that the political interest in low consumer prices is unlikely to 
provide much resistance to increasing agricultural protection in India if domestic and external 
conditions create strong producer pressures in that direction. Medium or long term scenarios 
favoring increasing protection could include the following elements: domestic production of 
major crops such as rice and wheat falling behind domestic demand, resulting in pressures for 
price increases and/or increases in input subsidies to maintain self sufficiency; falling world 
prices but domestic prices being maintained or even increasing slowly in real terms; real 
exchange rate appreciation reducing Rupee border prices while domestic prices remain about  
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the same or slowly increase; and no or limited progress in reducing agricultural protection in 
developed countries in WTO negotiations. The latter would reinforce already strong 
resistance to liberalizing India’s agricultural trade policies, first on the argument that tariff 
concessions should be held in reserve as bargaining chips to be exchanged for substantial 
concessions by the developed countries,
25 and second on the ground that the continuing 
isolation of the developed country domestic markets perpetuates price instability in world 
markets, and therefore Indian trade policies should continue to insulate domestic markets 
from world market conditions.  
Scenarios that might reduce or slow down pressures for increased protection could 
include: a long run trend of increasing and more-stable world prices; yield and other 
productivity increases – including especially productivity increases in transport, storage and 
marketing – which might fully or partially offset other factors increasing domestic prices 
relative to border prices; productivity and production increases leading to exportable 
surpluses and pressures to cut production if export subsidies are needed to profitably export 
the surpluses; successful WTO negotiations on the reduction of developed country protection 
and subsidies (especially export subsidies) leading to greater willingness in India to consider 
more open agricultural trade policies; and, at the WTO, closing or tightening of the export 
subsidy loopholes
26 and more active enforcement on the part of other countries of India’s no-
export-subsidy commitment under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. 
In thinking about these scenarios, a distinction needs to be made between changes in 
implicit protection and changes in the formal protective instruments such as tariffs. Under an 
increasing protection scenario, domestic prices would rise relative to world prices, but big 
increases could occur without increasing the present applied tariffs or tightening other 
protective instruments, because of the very considerable redundancy in the present formal 
protection levels. If tariffs and the other formal protective instruments are to be reduced, the 
initiative would need to come through the WTO, as there appear to be little or no domestic 




                                                 
25 It has been suggested (Gulati 2004) that one reason that India set such high agricultural tariffs, was the US 
proposal that applied tariffs, not tariff bindings, should be the starting point for future negotiations on tariff 
reductions. 
26 Some of the Indian export subsidies have been justified under the WTO rule that allows developing countries 
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Figure 1: Unweighted average import tariffs on agricultural and non-agricultural goods, 





















































2002/03 and 2003/04 include para-tariffs 
which were abolished in 2004/05. Averages 
are of ad-valorem tariffs only and do not 
take account of specific component of 
compound duties. 
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Figure 2: Real effective exchage rate index, India, 1965 to 2004 
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 Source: Authors’ calculations based on official data.  
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Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, importable and all covered agricultural 
















































































































































































Source: Authors' calculations.  
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Figure 4: Real domestic producer and international reference prices for rice, India, 1965 to 
2004 

















































Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Figure 5: Nominal rates of assistance to all agricultural tradable industries, all non-
agricultural tradables, and relative rates of assistance,




















































































































































































t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. The 1965-69 NRAnonag rate is a guesstimate 
 




Share of GDP:   1950  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000  2003 2004 2005
Livestock n.a.  n.a. n.a. 1.9 4.7 5.4  4.6 4.8 4.4
Crops n.a.  n.a. n.a. 33.7 23.8 15.8  14.4 12.2 12.1
All  agriculture  56.9 46.7 46.1 38.9 31.3 23.4 20.9 18.8 18.3
Forestry  and  logging  3.0 2.2 2.1 2.5 1.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7
Fishing  0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1
Mining  and  quarrying  0.8 1.1 1.1 1.7 2.7 2.4 2.5 3.0 2.8
Manufacturing  10.6 13.8 13.8 16.3 17.1 15.6 15.2 15.9 16.0
Services  31.8 38.4 39.1 43.1 48.8 58.7 61.3 62.4 62.9
TOTAL    100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
    
Agriculture’s share in 
employment 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 69 62  60 n.a. n.a.
 
  
Sources: Authors computations based on official Economic Survey and National Accounts Statistics, various years Table 2: Shares of agricultural and manufacturing imports and exports in total trade and in value 
of sectoral production, India, 1960 to 2005 
  
( percent) 
   1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2004 2005
Share of total imports:                
Primary agricultural, fish & forest products  27.2 23.7 3.5 1.9  0.7  0.9 0.8
Edible  oils  0.3 2.4 5.6 0.8 2.6 2.2 1.4
Manufactured  products  66.1 61.3 42.9 56.9 51.9 46.2 47.1
Share of total exports:               
Primary agricultural, fish & forest products  44.3 30.7 30.2 17.8  12.8  9.8 9.6
Manufactured  products  45.3 53.6 59.2 72.3 77.7 73.0 70.3
                 
Imports as a share of production:               
Primary agricultural, fish & forest products  3.4 1.7 0.7 0.4  0.3  0.8 0.8
Edible  oils  0.0 0.2 1.2 0.2 1.2 1.8 1.3
Manufactured products
b 9.5 4.2 5.6 6.3  8.6  11.6 13.3
Exports as a share of production:               
Primary agricultural, fish & forest products  3.2 2.1 3.3 3.2  5.1  5.9 6.4




b Excludes POL and non-metallic mineral manufactures (which mainly consist of rough 
diamonds).  
 
Sources: Economic Survey and National Accounts Statistics, various years 





 1964-72 1973-79 1980-86 1987-96  1997-2004
Rice (including  basmati)  19.8 19.4 15.1 14.6  11.7
Wheat 4.5 6.0 9.5 9.2  9.5
Maize 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.0  1.3
Sorghum (jowar)  2.1 1.9 1.9 1.3  0.9
Soybean 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.0  1.6
Rape/mustard seed  0.7 0.7 1.1 1.4  1.3
Sunflower seed  0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3  0.2
Chickpea (gram)  2.4 2.8 1.9 1.6  1.4
Groundnut 3.6 3.4 2.6 2.5  2.1
Seed cotton (kapas)  2.3 2.5 2.5 2.4  2.1
Sugar cane  1.5 2.7 2.3 3.3  2.7
Fresh fruit and vegetables  12.7 13.6 14.8 14.4  18.3
Dairying 9.6 11.7 13.5 15.8  17.5
All covered products  60.4 66.0 67.0 69.0  70.7
Non covered  39.6 34.0 33.0 31.0  29.3
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on farmgate value of production at domestic pricesas reported 










   Percent of Subsidy as  percent of  gross value 
   total subsidy of production at: 
     Domestic Reference 
     price price 
         
Rice 37.1 18.3 15.4 
Wheat 35.2 27.2 18.9 
Maize 2.1 9.3 8.8 
Sorghum 1.8 12.4 11.5 
Chickpea 2.7 11.4 10.9 
Groundnut 2.7 8.4 5.7 
Rape/mustard seed  4.5 11.7 18.0 
Soybean 1.1 4.3 2.9 
Sunflower seed  0.5 8.8 8.6 
Sugar   6.6 12.5 15.4 
Cotton 5.6 13.2 12.3 
Total: 11 crops  100.0 16.9 13.0 
 
a The total value of the input subsidies for these 11 crops this year was $US7.8 billion ($1.9 
billion for fertilizer and $5.9 billion for electricity). 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 




  1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Milk
d  n.a. n.a. 152.6 113.5 136.8 40.5  22.1 32.3
Rice  -30.0 -23.4 -39.2 -31.0 -3.8 -21.1 -13.0 20.8
Wheat  31.4 30.3 2.8 1.6 9.2 10.5 14.2 38.4
Maize 63.8  49.2 2.5 -1.2 26.5 3.1  2.6 11.9
Sorghum  41.7 55.0 11.6 6.5 35.7 7.2 21.2 15.7
Groundnut  23.4 1.6 -17.0 21.7 61.6 17.7 7.9 12.9
Fruit and veg  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -15.7  -13.4 -8.9
Rape/mustard  seed  62.9 38.8 16.6 38.2 74.8 64.8 37.0 64.8
Soybean
d  n.a. 0.0 -14.8 -1.3 19.1 3.1 2.9 2.9
Sunflower
d  n.a. n.a. 0.0 7.8 56.1 17.9  13.3 14.6
Sugar  158.4 17.7 -9.4 9.5 56.0 7.2 12.6 39.3
Cotton 17.5  78.3 8.9 0.4 33.6 22.6  6.2 12.0
Chickpea 24.5  1.3 0.0 7.7 12.2 9.2  15.0 18.7
Importables  41.2 52.6 74.4 59.0 81.5 38.3 22.6 34.2
Exportables  -30.0 -22.3 -35.8 -27.8 -6.8 -15.4 -12.4 -6.1
Nontradables  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 4.0 6.8  16.1 22.6
All above products
a  -0.2 0.2 -5.5 1.9 24.9 1.8 0.6 15.8
  of which input subs.  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.6 5.8  7.6 9.7
Dispersion of 
covered products
c  42.8 17.8 6.5 18.8 49.0 46.6 12.5 24.1
% coverage (at 
undistorted prices)




Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production; below them is 
shown in italics the contribution to the average NRA of input subsidies, from Appendix Table 
A2.  
b 
Mixed trade status products are included in exportable or import-competing groups depending 
on their trade status each year.  
c Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted 
mean of NRAs of covered products.  
d Estimates for soybean start in 1973, and those for sunflower and milk in 1975. 




   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Covered products 
a -0.2 0.2 -5.5 1.9  24.9 1.8 0.6 15.8
Non-covered products
b   -0.2 0.2 -5.5 1.9  24.9 1.8 0.6 15.8
Total agricultural NRA
a  -0.2 0.2 -5.5 1.9 24.9 1.8 0.6 15.8
   
Trade bias index 
c -0.51 -0.50 -0.63 -0.55  -0.48 -0.38 -0.28 -0.29
   
Assistance to just tradables:   
   All agricultural tradables  -7.0 12.6 -7.4 4.1  67.5 2.0 -2.3 15.4
   All non-agricultural tradables  113.0 83.1 64.8 59.3  48.6 15.9 12.6 5.2
Relative rate of assistance, RRA 
e  -56.3 -38.3 -43.8 -33.5 11.7 -12.1 -12.9 12.5
 
a NRAs including product-specific input subsidies, which in India’s case includes non-product-specific (NPS) assistance that has been allocated 
to products (see Table 4 above). The input component of the NRA is assistance to primary factors and intermediate inputs divided by total value of 
primary agricultural production at undistorted prices (%). 
 
b Non-covered products (30 percent of the sector’s value of production in 2000-04) are assumed to have the same average NRA as covered 
products, and also the same shares of production in import-competing, exportable and nontradable categories.  
 
c Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the 
import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 
 
d This number is not estimated, but authors’ assumption. 
 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. The 1965-69 NRAnonag rate is a guesstimate.  
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet Table 7: Self sufficiency ratios for selected foods, India, 1961 to 2004 
 
(production as a proportion of consumption) 
 
  1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Milk
  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Rice  0.99 0.98 0.97 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.02
Wheat  0.72 0.71 0.91 1.02 0.99 0.96 1.00 1.02 1.02
Maize  0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.01
Sorghum  1.00 0.92 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Groundnut  1.01 0.99 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.04 1.02
Soybean
  0.96 0.89 1.02 1.03 1.07 0.95 0.98 1.15 0.94
Sunflower
  n.a. n.a.  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.04
 





Appendix: Key quantity and price data, assumptions and sources 
 
 
Quantity data  
 
Production volume data are from Agricultural Statistics at a Glance (2005) 
Export and import volume data are from FAOSTAT (2006) 
  
 
Farm-gate product prices are from India Stat website (www.indiastat.com), Bulletin on Food 
Statistics (2002 and previous years), Agriculture Prices in India (2002 and previous years) and 
Fertilizer Statistics. Details for each crop are listed below 
  
Wheat  Bulletin on Food Statistics and Fertilizer Statistics 
Rice  Bulletin on Food Statistics and Fertilizer Statistics 
Maize www.indiastat.com 
Sorghum  Bulletin on Food Statistics 
Groundnut  Agriculture Prices in India and India stat website 
Rapeseed  Agriculture Prices in India and India stat website 
Soybean  Agriculture Prices in India and India stat website 
Sunflower  Agriculture Prices in India and India stat website 
Sugar  Agriculture Prices in India and India stat website 
Chickpea  Agriculture Prices in India and India stat website 
Cotton  Agriculture Prices in India and India stat website 
 
 
Border prices  
Fob and cif prices are calculated from various sources which differ from crop to crop. See Gulati, 
Hanson and Pursell (1990), Gulati and Kelley (1999), Orden et al. (2007) and other cited 
references for more detail  
  
Wheat  fob US Gulf, HRW; Source: FAO series and USDA 
Rice  fob bangkok, Thai 15% broken; Source: USDA 
Maize 
fob US Gulf ports, Yellow No. 2; Source: USDA and commodity price data, 
World Bank 
Sorghum 
fob US Gulf ports; Source: International Financial Statistics and commodity 
price data, World Bank 
Groundnut  fob US converted from c.i.f Rotterdam; Source: Oil World 
Rapeseed  fob US converted from c.i.f Rotterdam; Source: Oil World 
Soybean  fob US No 2 yellow converted from c.i.f Rotterdam; Source: FAO statistics 
Sunflower  fob US converted from c.i.f Rotterdam; Oil World 
Sugar  fob Caribbean ports, Source: Sugar Yearbook, International Sugar organization 
Chickpea  Import Unit value, Source: FAO Trade Yearbook 






Official exchange rates are from  IMF (2006 and earlier years). The individual crop studies use 
average monthly rates (usually for harvest periods) which differ somewhat from these annual 
calendar averages. All the NRAs and other indicators use averages of official exchange rates  
 
Production and input taxes and subsidies 
Production - Agricultural statistics at a Glance (2005) 
Input Subsidies – Authors’ calculations 
 
Fruit and vegetable prices 
The NRA estimates for fresh fruits and vegetables are based on price comparison 
estimates for 2002/03 which were then projected forwards and back using Indian WPI indices of  
fresh fruits and vegetables for domestic prices, and an index of long term international fresh fruit 
and vegetable prices based on US dollar unit values from world trade statistics.
27 The broad 
pattern that emerges is plausible and consistent with research during the 2000s and 1990s and 
newspaper reports and other general sources. Until about 1985, in real terms domestic fruit and 
vegetable prices were quite stable. From then to the present they moved ahead of the general rate 
of inflation, but only slightly: according to these indices in 2005 they were just about 25 percent 
higher than they had been in 1965. By contrast world prices (in constant $US) were much less 
stable, with large year to year fluctuations, a steep decline during the early 1980s of about 30 
percent, followed by a modest recovery up to 1991, then renewed decline until 2002.  In 2005, 
the real US dollar index of world fresh fruit and vegetable prices was 40 percent below its level 
in 1981, and 25 percent below its level in 1965. During this entire period, the Indian market for 
fruits and vegetables was insulated from import competition by the general ban on imports of 
consumer goods which was only finally removed in 2001, and by high tariffs since 2001 plus 
SPS regulations in the background.  At the same time, despite low domestic prices, for most of 
the period the domestic market was also cut off from exporting on any significant scale by 
domestic transaction costs which are very high relative to potential fob prices. Hence up to 1990 
fresh fruits and vegetables are treated as non-tradables and the NRA during these years is 
assumed to be zero.  
 
Dairy prices and subsidies 
   Since 1970 India’s dairying sector has been promoted by government import substitution 
and promotion policies, with import competition for many years regulated by non-tariff barriers 
and more recently by tariffs. Until 1992, these policies maintained the domestic prices of 
internationally traded dairy products—especially skimmed milk powder (SMP) and butter oil —
at levels that were far above (two to three times) world prices. However, since 1992 the implicit 
protection rates of these products has declined, especially of SMP where domestic prices in 
recent years appear to have gone below import reference prices. The  protection rates of milk 
have been estimated by comparing domestic wholesale milk prices in four major urban centres—
Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata—with estimated reconsituted milk prices based on the 
assumption that SMP and butter oil could have been imported free of tariffs and QRs.
28 These 
                                                 
27 We are grateful to Ernesto Valenzuela for providing the world price data 
28 These estimates use the original data base and  update and amend estimates for the period 1976-1996  made in a 
study be  Rakotoarisoa and Gulati (2006). After 2001 we were not able to find statistics on actual wholesale milk  
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calculations take account of the large share of buffalo milk (which has a considerably higher fat 
content than cow milk) in Indian consumption, and assume that overall Indian consumers do not 
have a price preference for fresh over reconstituted milk. It is also assumed that changes in 
wholesale urban processed milk prices are fully passed back to raw milk prices received by dairy 
farmers. The resulting NRA series for raw milk is available since 1976. The large fluctuations in 
the NRAs between 1976 and 1993, and the sharp decline since then are almost entirely due to 
changes in world prices and in the Rupee exchange rate: domestic milk prices in real terms have 
been very stable, barely changing at all between 1976 and 1993, after which they came down by 
about 10 percent to a new also fairly stable level. The drop in the NRA from around 190 percent 
in 1987 to just 20 percent in 1994 was principally due to the Rupee devaluations during these 
years, which were the main reason for an increase in real import reference prices over the same 
period of around 130 percent. Although there have been fairly wide fluctuations in world prices 
since 1994, import reference prices of reconstituted milk have never been as far below domestic 
milk prices as they were during the early period. 
  In addition to protection against import competition, the dairying sector has also 
benefited from government subsidies, mainly channeled through the principal government 
promotional organization, NDDB (National Dairy Development Board). During the 1980s and 
before, the subsidies were large in relation to the activities of NDDB, but they were tiny in 
relation to the total value of Indian milk production. The principal subsidies were free supplies to 
NDDB of imported SMP, WMP (whole milk powder) and butter oil, which it used to produce 
and sell reconstituted milk, and later on free supplies of imported butter which it resold. These 
supplies came from surplus EU stocks or from imports financed by FAO and by a series of 
World Bank loans. In 1982, a peak year for these food aid subsidies, their value to NDDB was  
about $158 million,
29 equivalent to only 1.7 percent of of the total value of Indian raw milk 
production in that year. In other years the annual estimated subsidy was much lower than this 
e.g. in 1990 $21 million,
30 compared with raw milk production valued in the national accounts at 
$14.7 billion. Although dairying  has also benefited from other subsidies, including direct grants 
and preferential interest rates, overall these seem to be very small in relation to the size of the 
sector and they have not been considered in this study. 
 
 
List of key data sources 
 
FAOSTAT (2006), Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics Databases. Available at: 
//faostat.fao.org. Accessed 1 October. 
                                                                                                                                                             
prices in the four cities studied. The prices in these cities in subsequent years have been estimated by applying the 
All India wholesale price index for milk to the latest available actual prices. 
29 Approximation from World Bank (1996, Table 4.1), which estimates that in this year the  value at world prices 
(valued in 1990 US dollars) of dairy products supplied free of charge to NDDB was $215 million.The 1982 nominal 
US dollar subsidy is approximated by adjusting by the US CPI .  
30 Source: World Bank (1996), Table 4.1 In this and earlier years, the principal benefit to NDDB was the economic 
rent resulting from its monopoly of dairy product imports and its sales at the high protected domestic price. Since 
these profits were reinvested by NDDB in development activities (e.g. dairy cooperatives, vetinerary services etc) 
the total subsidy was in fact greater than the world-price  value of the imported dairy products. But even allowing 
for this, the subsidy was still tiny in relation to total value of national milk production. The principal financial 
stimulus to the expansion of milk production was the maintenance of stable domestic milk prices and the insulation 




FAO (1996), Trade Yearbook 1996, Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization. 
 
IMF (2005 and earlier years), Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions: Annual 
Report, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund (available back to 1950). 
 
IMF (2006 and earlier years), International Financial Statistics, Washington DC: International 
Monetary Fund (annual). 
 
Oil World (2002 and earlier years), available at  
http://www.oilworld.biz/app.php?ista=edd4381218aedb41cc358baf0a27ab16 
 
International Sugar Organization (2003 and previous years), Sugar Yearbook.  
 
World Bank (2006 and earlier years), Commodity prices data.  
 
Government of India (2002 and previous years), Bulletin on Food Statistics, Directorate of 
Economics and Statistics, Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
Government of India (2002 and previous years), Agricultural Prices in India, Directorate of 
Economics and Statistics, Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture. 
 



























                                   ACRONYMS 
AOA  Agreement on Agriculture 
APL  Above poverty line 
BPL  Below poverty line 
CPI  Consumer Price Index 
CTE  Consumer Tax Equivalent 
FAO  Food and Agricultural Organization 
FCI  Food Corporation of India 
FTA   Free Trade Agreement 
HS  Harmonized System 
MFN  Most Favoured Nation 
NDDB  National Dairy Development Board 
NRA  Nominal Rate of Assistance 
NRAm  Nominal Rate of Assistance (w.r.t. import reference prices) 
NRAx  Nominal Rate of Assistance (w.r.t. export reference prices) 
NTB   Non Tariff Barrier 
PDS  Public distribution system 
PL 480  Public Law 480 
QR  Quantitative Restriction 
REER  Real Effective Exchange Rate 
SAFTA  South Asia Free Trade Agreement 
SAPTA  South Asia Preferential Trade Agreement 
SMP  Skimmed milk powder 
SPS  Sanitary and Phyto Sanitary 
STE  State Trading Enterprise 
TBT   Technical Barriers to Trade 
TRQ   Tariff Rate Quota 
USDA  US Department of Agriculture 
WMP  Whole milk powder 
WPI  Wholesale Price Index 
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1965  5 33  0 54 85 na 66  0 46 na  171 na 47 21 
1966  4  6  0 24 81 na 40  -34 25 na  181 na 11 -2 
1967 39 16  0  6 59 na 83  -37 65 na  126 na 19 -5 
1968  0  0  0 16 36 na 64  -44 12 na  224 na 42  -13 
1969 75 34  0 18 57 na 62  -35 60 na 90 na 39  0 
1970  0 85  0  0 23 na 56  -16 35 na 52 na 58  8 
1971  0 90  0  0 34 na 65  0 97 na 29 na 53 17 
1972  0  122  0  8  106 na 72  0 39 na 59 na 41 19 
1973 0  107 0 0  55  na 0  -34  48 0 0  na 0  -6 
1974 7  -12 0 0  28  na 1  -67  56 0  -51  na 0  -36 
1975 0 0 0  -31  -31  130 0  -58 0  -16  -69 0 0  -29 
1976 0  30 0  -14 0  171 0  -36 0  -14  -16 0  -3  -1 
1977  0  0  0  -21 20  176 27  -29 45 -6  8  0 18  5 
1978 0  15 0  -18  24  137  34  -43 8  -28  30 0 0  -6 
1979 0 0 0 0 0  149  22  -29 5  -10 0 0 0 3 
1980  26 8 0 0 0  93  50  -45 0 0  -24 1 0  -9 
1981 9  -9 0  25 0  68  46  -54  16 0  -18 3  -2  -15 
1982 0 9 0  35 4  97  34  -30  10 0  25  28 0 6 
1983 0 8 0  21 9  146  47  -13 4 0  21 0 0  13 
1984 3  -14 0  28  -20  164  15  -13 2  -6  44 7  11  15 
1985 34  6  0 41  4  186 12  6 24  9 93 52 12 29 
1986  3 34  0 95 10  192 60  4 66 35 76  117  8 32 
1987  5 90  0  124 86  178  136  8 56 44 68 65 14 43 
1988 12 25  0 18 33 79  113  -21 19  5 37  5 18 14 
1989  7 14  0 31 -1 49 53  -16 13  4  6 40 -6  8 
1990 15 10  0 39  8 91  113  -18  6  5  6 45 29 16 
1991 9 1  -17  36  11  48  77  -27 7 4 8  32  -5 0 
1992 9 6  -32 4  -15  16  48  -30  -3 3 7 4  -9  -12 
1993 6  31  -17 4 3  24  49  -13  -25 1 8 4  17 1 
1994 7  65  -13 6 9  23  37  -17  51 3 8 5  21 4 
1995  16  -6  -21 7  11 0  22  -9 2 4  -5 7  -13  -7 
1996 11 -6 -9  6 -5 21 19  -31  9  3  9 11  -15 -7 
1997 24 12  -17  8  -12 20 21  -21 13  0 11 10 35 -2 
1998 10 14 -2  6  8 26 67  0 33  3 10 18 34 11 
1999 14 16  -19 12 11 44 56 -5 50  5 37 21 31  8 
2000 18 22  -13 13 12 14 53 15 13  7 29 17 38  9 
2001 35 -1  0 11 12 31 36 18 16  7  9 19 36 17 
2002 16  7 -5 17 16 59 72 29 16 10 44 16 47 26 
2003 11 17  -14 15  9 40 89 19 15 -2 51 11 34 16 
2004 13 15  -13  9 10 17 75 22 18 -8 63 10 37 11 
 
a Based on earlier  research the NRA series for chickpeas is used to represent pulses in general 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A2: Annual nominal rates of assistance to all agricultural products,
a to 
exportable and import-competing agricultural industries, and relative to non-agricultural 
industries,
b India, 1964 to 2004  (percent) 
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Covered products 













1965  0  21 20  20 na  55  54  113
 c
  -56 
1966  0  -2 -3  -2  -34  33  -4  113
 c
  -55 
1967  0  -5 -5  -5  -37  35  -6  113
 c
  -56 
1968  0  -13 -13  -13 -44  39  -17  113
 c
  -61 
1969  0  0 0  0  -35 46  0  113
 c
  -53 
1970  0  8  8  8 -16  53 12  79  -37 
1971  0  17 17  17  0  61  61  85  -13 
1972  0  19 19  19  0  53  53  81  -16 
1973  0  -6 -6  -6  -34  73  -13 83  -52 
1974  0  -36 -36  -36 -61  24  -50  87  -73 
1975  0  -29 -28  -28 -57  77  -39  66  -64 
1976  0  -1 -1  -1  -25 110  -2 57  -38 
1977  0  5 5  5  -28 58  6  64  -35 
1978  0  -6 -6  -6  -40  59  -9 61  -43 
1979  0  3 3  3  -29 69  7  76  -39 
1980  0  -9 -9  -9  -43  57  -15 82  -53 
1981  0  -15 -15  -15 -39  42  -18  63  -50 
1982  0  6 5  6  -30 46  9  54  -29 
1983  0  13  13  13 -13  54 21  56  -22 
1984  3  11  15  15 -14  95 23  42  -13 
1985  5  24 29  29  4  99  85  49  25 
1986  3  29 32  32  0 102  102  52  32 
1987  5  38 43  43  0 122  123  59  40 
1988  5  9  14  14 -21  49 18  46  -19 
1989  5  3  8  8 -13  35 10  37  -20 
1990  7  9  16  16 -14  72 21  35  -11 
1991  5  -5 0  0  -19 42  -1  13  -12 
1992  5  -17 -12  -12 -25  19  -15  2  -16 
1993  5  -4 1  1  -10 27  0  11  -9 
1994  7  -2  4  4 -9  31 4 19  -13 
1995  7  -14 -7  -7  -13  2  -9 19  -24 
1996  6  -13 -7  -7  -19  21  -9 15  -22 
1997  7  -9 -2  -2  -18  20  -7 11  -16 
1998  8  3 11  11  0  26  9  10  -1 
1999  8  0 8  8  -12 44  5  8  -2 
2000  9  1  9  9 -2  18 7  4  3 
2001  10  7 17  17  -1  31  29  0  28 
2002  12  14 26  26  -4  55  24  4  19 
2003  9  7  16  16 -13  42 12  13  -1 
2004  9  2  11 11  -12  25 5 na  na 
a NRAs including assistance to nontradables and product-specific input subsidies.
 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
c authors’ assumptions.
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A3: Annual value shares of primary production of covered and non-covered 
products,






































1965 3 3  15 4 2  na 1  21 3  na 2  na 4  43 
1966 2 3  13 3 2  na 1  22 3  na 2  na 4  45 
1967 3 3  13 3 2  na 1  28 3  na 1  na 6  39 
1968 2 3  12 3 1  na 1  30 3  na 1  na 5  39 
1969 2 3  16 4 1  na 1  26 2  na 2  na 6  38 
1970 3 2  15 5 2  na 1  24 3  na 2  na 7  37 
1971 3 3  16 5 2  na 1  22 2  na 2  na 8  36 
1972 3 3  18 4 1  na 1  19 2  na 2  na 7  38 
1973 2 2  13 5 1  na 1  24 2 0 3  na 5  40 
1974 2 3 9 3 1  na 1  32 2 0 3  na 5  39 
1975 2 2 8 3 2 4 1  31 2 0 7 0 6  32 
1976 2 3  13 4 2 5 1  23 3 0 3 0 8  33 
1977 2 4  13 5 1 5 1  25 3 0 3 0 7  31 
1978 2 3  12 4 1 5 1  29 2 0 2 0 8  30 
1979 1 4  14 4 1 5 1  21 3 0 3 0 8  34 
1980 2 3  12 3 1 6 1  25 2 0 3 0 7  35 
1981 2 3  11 3 1 7 1  28 2 0 4 0 6  32 
1982 2 3  14 2 1 7 1  20 2 0 4 0 9  34 
1983 2 3  14 4 1 6 1  20 3 0 3 0 9  34 
1984 2 4  16 3 2 6 2  19 2 0 2 0 8  33 
1985 3 3  19 2 1 7 1  19 2 0 2 0 9  31 
1986 2 2  22 2 2 7 1  18 1 0 2 0 9  32 
1987 2 3  20 2 1 8 1  15 2 1 3 0 8  34 
1988 2 2  15 3 1 9 1  19 2 1 3 0 6  33 
1989 2 3  14 3 1  12 1  19 2 1 4 0 7  31 
1990 2 3  15 3 1 9 1  20 2 1 5 1 6  30 
1991 1 3  15 2 1  11 1  19 1 1 4 0 6  32 
1992 1 2  17 3 1  12 1  18 1 1 4 0 6  32 
1993 2 3  16 3 1  13 1  18 2 1 3 0 6  30 
1994 2 3  16 3 1  14 2  19 1 2 3 1 7  27 
1995 1 3  17 2 1  16 2  14 1 1 5 0 7  29 
1996 1 3  15 2 1  13 2  19 1 2 4 0 7  30 
1997 2 3  21 2 1  14 1  19 1 2 4 0 6  26 
1998 2 3  20 3 1  15 1  17 1 1 3 0 6  27 
1999 1 2  22 1 1  13 1  18 1 1 3 0 7  29 
2000 1 2  22 1 1  18 1  13 1 1 4 0 6  29 
2001 2 2  20 2 1  16 1  14 1 1 5 0 7  29 
2002 1 1  23 1 1  16 1  11 1 1 4 0 7  32 
2003 2 2  23 2 1  15 1  11 1 2 3 0 6  31 
2004 1 2  22 2 1  17 1  10 1 2 2 0 6  31 
a At farmgate undistorted prices 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
 
10



















1964 M na  N M na na M na M na na na M 
1965 M M N M M na M N M na M na M 
1966 M M N M M na M X M na M na M 
1967 M M N M M na M X M na M na M 
1968 N N N M M na M X M na M na M 
1969 M M N M M na M X M na M na M 
1970 N M N N M na M X M na M na M 
1971 N M N N M na M N M na M na M 
1972 N M N M M na M N M na M na M 
1973 N M N N M  na N X M N N  na N 
1974 M X N N M  na M X M N X  na N 
1975 N N N X X M N X M X X N N 
1976 N M N X N M N X N X X N X 
1977 N N N X M M M X M X M N M 
1978 N M N X M M M X M X M N N 
1979 N N N N N M M X M X M N N 
1980 M M N N N M M X N N X M N 
1981 M X N M N M M X M N X M X 
1982 N M N M M M M X M N M M N 
1983 N M N M M M M X M X M N N 
1984 N X N M X M M X N X M N N 
1985 M X N M N M M N M N M M N 
1986 M M N M M M M N M M M M N 
1987 N M N M M M M N M M M M N 
1988 M M N M M M M X M N M N N 
1989 M M N M X M M X M N N M X 
1990 M N N M N M M X N N X M N 
1991 N X X M M M M X N M N M X 
1992 N X X N X M M X X N N N X 
1993 N M X N X M M X X X N N X 
1994 N M X N N M M X M N N M X 
1995 N X X N N M M X X N X N X 
1996 N X X N X M M X N N N N X 
1997 M N X N X M M X N X N N N 
1998 N N X N X M M X M X M N N 
1999 N N X N N M M X M X M N N 
2000 N N X N N M M X N N M N N 
2001 M X N N N M M N N N N N N 
2002 N X X M N M M N N N M N N 
2003 N N X M N M M N N X M N N 
2004 N N X N N M M N M X M N N 
Summary: percentage of years a product has a particular trade status: 
N  65 28 65 42 35  0  7 25 28 47 23 69 56 
M  35 48 35 49 45  100 93  0 65  9 60 31 23 
X  0 25  0  9 20  0  0 75  7 44 18  0 21 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet, where N=nontradable, M=import-competing and X=exportable  
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Source: Easterly, W. (2006), Global Development Network Growth Database, accessible at 
http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/global%20development%20network%20growth%20databas
e.htm 